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Abstract 
During 2005-2006, the Chinese government implemented a reform aimed at eliminating the so-
called non-tradable shares (NTS), shares typically held by the State or by politically connected 
institutional investors that were issued at the early stage of financial market development. Our 
analysis, based on the time series of risk factors and on the cross section of abnormal returns, 
confirms that the NTS reform affected stock prices, particularly benefiting small stocks, stocks 
characterized by historically poor returns, stocks issued by companies with less transparent 
accounts and poorer governance, and less liquid stocks Historically neglected stocks also 
witnessed an increase in the volume of trading and market prices. 
Keywords: Ownership structure; Chinese stock market; Financial reform; Corporate governance; 
Privatization; Neglected stocks 
JEL Ns: G14, G28, G32 5
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Non-technical summary 
Ever since the late 1980s the Chinese corporate sector was overwhelmingly dominated by 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Significant steps were taken with the establishment of the two 
major stock exchanges in 1990 and 1991 and with the first wave of capital-raising IPOs, which 
initially diluted government ownership of the typical Chinese firms. Yet controls remained 
firmly in State hands, largely due to the peculiar structure of listed firms. At the beginning of 
2005, about two thirds of the Chinese stock market was composed of non-tradable shares (NTS). 
NTS was a special class of shares entitling the holders to exactly the same rights as holders of 
ordinary shares except for public trading. Typically, these shares belonged to the State or to 
domestic financial institutions ultimately owned by central or local governments. There was an 
implicit contract between investors and the State that NTS would never be traded in the stock 
market, preventing any attempt to complete the privatization process. As we will document in 
this paper, companies characterized by a relevant proportion of NTS were neglected by 
investors. 
In 2005, the Chinese authorities announce a reform aimed at eliminating NTS by the end 
of 2006. As a compensation for the renegotiation of the implicit contract, the reform forces the 
holders of NTS to pay holders of tradable shares (TS) in exchange for the possibility to sell their 
shares in the future.  
Apart from the compensation, the reform had very little direct immediate impact on the 
structure of the Chinese stock market in the short run. However it can nevertheless be regarded 
as value-enhancing for the following reasons. First, the expectation of a more diffuse ownership 
structure should be beneficial to stock . Second, the reform creates the conditions for an 
advancement of the privatization process and improvement in corporate governance which in 
turn should bring about an increase in value of the firm. Third, the increase in the supply of 
tradable shares should also be valuable due to its positive effects on liquidity. Finally, the 
resolution of uncertainty, associated with previous failed attempts to reform the Chinese stock 
market, should be positive due to its elimination of a source of non-diversifiable risk and a 
consequent reduction in the risk premium.  
Our hypothesis is that the announcement of the reform should positively affect the prices 
of those stocks that can benefit more from the reform. The latter are stocks with characteristics 
that investors do not like, associated with risk or operational inefficiency, and that have a 
potential to exploit the degrees of freedom allowed by the reform. For example, a stock with a 
large proportion of NTS is likely to share many of those characteristics: it has a small float, 
which may be associated with low turnover and high volatility, it is unlikely to show a good 
corporate governance and/or be the target of a takeover, which may preserve operational 
inefficiencies.  
In this paper we evaluate the market impact of the announcement of the reform by 
considering cross-sectional regressions of abnormal returns on firm variables related to their 
corporate governance (e.g. the proportion of shares held by non-controlling blockholders and 
board characteristics), ownership structure and stock market characteristics (e.g. liquidity) 
measured before the event period. We also use a portfolio time-series approach to control for 6
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corporate governance, size and liquidity factors. We conjecture that an announcement of a 
reform would cause positive unexpected returns for stocks that are sensitive to systematic risk 
factors, particularly corporate governance and liquidity. 
Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that stocks with less attractive 
characteristics (small stocks, stocks characterized by historically poor returns, stocks issued by 
companies with less transparent accounts and poorer governance, less liquid stocks) benefited 
from this reform relatively more than stocks that already had better characteristics. We find that:  
(i) The market rose upon the announcement of the reform, and that portfolios 
representing factors associated with liquidity, governance and size reacted in a 
coherent way;  
(ii) The initial share of NTS, a proxy for the potential for further privatization and 
corporate governance improvements, is empirically very relevant in explaining 
the cross-section of stock returns;  
(iii) The best performing stocks in the event window were characterized by small 
size, low past returns, low liquidity, low profitability, high volatility, low 
attention on the part of institutional and international investors as measured 
before the beginning of the reform;  
(iv) Only some of the variables that explain the price reaction also explain the 
compensation paid to holders of TS, and when they do their signs are often 
different, suggesting that Chinese investors looked beyond the short term 
compensation;  
(v) The increase in volume and liquidity is also biased towards neglected stocks, 
which is not consistent with a simplistic explanation associated with 
speculation. There is no reason why speculators should have preferred to trade 
in stocks with such characteristics; 
(vi) The results are robust also to including several other variables and considering 
different event windows. 7
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1. Introduction 
Ever since the late 1980s the Chinese corporate sector was overwhelmingly 
dominated by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Significant steps were taken with the 
establishment of two major stock exchanges in 1990 and 1991 and with the first wave of 
capital-raising IPOs, which initially diluted government ownership of the typical Chinese 
firms. Yet controls remained firmly in State hands, largely due to the peculiar structure of 
listed firms. At the beginning of 2005, about two thirds of the Chinese stock market was 
composed of non-tradable shares (NTS), a special class of shares entitling the holders to 
exactly the same rights as holders of ordinary shares except for public trading. Typically, 
these shares belonged to the State or to domestic financial institutions ultimately owned 
by central or local governments
1. There was an implicit contract between investors and 
the State that NTS would never be traded in the stock market. As we will document in 
this paper, companies characterized by a relevant proportion of NTS were typically 
neglected by investors. 
In 2005, the Chinese authorities announced a reform aimed at eliminating NTS by 
the end of 2006. The reform obliged the holders of NTS to compensate the holders of 
tradable shares (TS) for the possibility to sell their shares in the future. Apart from the 
compensation, the reform had very little direct immediate impact on the structure of the 
Chinese stock market in the short run. However it can nevertheless be regarded as value-
enhancing for the following reasons. First, the expectation of a more diffuse ownership 
structure should be beneficial to stock
2. Second, the reform creates the conditions for an 
advancement of the privatization process and improvement in corporate governance 
                                                
1 See Sun and Tong (2003) for a detailed explanation. 
2 Ownership diversification is one of the essential step toward the development of a more mature and 
representative stock market in China, OECD Economic Surveys: China 2010.  8
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which in turn should bring about an increase in value of the firm (see Stulz (2005), 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007), Gompers, Ishii and Metricks (2003), Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2005), Cremers and Nair (2005), Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) and Morey 
et al. (2009)).
 3 Third, the increase in the supply of tradable shares should also be valuable 
due to its positive effects on liquidity, see Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) 
and Acharya and Pedersen (2005).
4Finally, the resolution of uncertainty, associated with 
previous failed attempts to reform the Chinese stock market, should be positive due to its 
elimination of a source of non-diversifiable risk and a consequent reduction in the risk 
premium.  
Our hypothesis is that the announcement of the reform should positively affect the 
prices of those stocks that can benefit more from the reform. The latter are stocks with 
characteristics that investors do not like, associated with risk or operational inefficiency, 
and that have a potential to exploit the degrees of freedom allowed by the reform. For 
example, a stock with a large proportion of NTS is likely to share many of those 
characteristics: it has a small float, which may be associated with low turnover and high 
volatility, it is unlikely to show a good corporate governance and/or be the target of a 
takeover, which may preserve operational inefficiencies.  
In this paper we evaluate the market impact of the announcement of the reform by 
considering cross-sectional regressions of abnormal returns on firm variables related to 
their corporate governance (e.g. the proportion of shares held by non-controlling 
                                                
3 This has been the experience in many developed and developing countries in which privatisation has been 
found to improve firm profitability, real output and efficiency, see Megginson and Netter (2001) and Kikeri 
and Nellis (2004) even though Calomiris et al. (2010) point out that in the Chinese case privatization may 
be associated with a reduction in profits. 
4 It is true that a negatively sloped demand function would require a decrease in the equilibrium price to 
absorb the new supply, but Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) show that expectations of future supply 
shocks may be beneficial to current stock prices. 9
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blockholders and board characteristics), ownership structure and stock market 
characteristics (e.g. liquidity) measured before the event period. We also use a portfolio 
time-series approach to control for corporate governance, size and liquidity factors. We 
conjecture that an announcement of a reform would cause positive unexpected returns for 
stocks that are sensitive to systematic risk factors, particularly corporate governance and 
liquidity. We find that: (i) the market rose upon the announcement of the reform, and that 
portfolios representing factors associated with liquidity, governance and size reacted in a 
coherent way; (ii) the initial share of NTS, a proxy for the potential for further 
privatization and corporate governance improvements, is empirically very relevant in 
explaining the cross-section of stock returns; (iii) the best performing stocks in the event 
window were characterized by small size, low past returns, low liquidity, low 
profitability, high volatility, low attention on the part of institutional and international 
investors as measured before the beginning of the reform; (iv) only some of the variables 
explaining the cross section of abnormal returns also explain the cross section of 
compensation paid to holders of TS and, when they do so, their signs are often different, 
suggesting that Chinese investors looked beyond the short term compensation and (v) the 
increase in volume and liquidity is also biased towards the stocks whose price benefited 
from the reform announcement, which is not consistent with a simplistic explanation 
associated with speculation. There is no reason why speculators should have preferred to 
trade stocks with such characteristics.  
We are aware of several other papers studying this reform. Lu, Balatbat and 
Czernkowski (2008) examine the reaction of prices both to the general announcement of 
the reform and to the company-specific announcements with particular regard to 10
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compensation characteristics for a sample of firms. Li, Wang, Cheung and Jiang (2010) 
study the reform on the basis of a general equilibrium model explaining compensation on 
the basis of company and shareholders characteristics and highlighting the role of risk 
sharing for efficiency gains. Haveman and Wang (2008) also discuss the struggle among 
different shareholders. Liao, Li, Liu and Wang (2008) study what happens to prices on 
the day of the lockup expiration. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first 
attempt to empirically evaluate the effects of the NTS reform using information from 
prices and volume after the announcement of the reform. 
After this introduction, the second section illustrates some key institutional 
features of the Chinese stock market and the mechanics of the NTS reform, the third 
section describes the relevant characteristics, the fourth section presents the empirical 
analysis and the fifth section concludes. 
2. The Chinese stock market and the NTS reform 
Chinese listed firms have multiple classes of shares: shares that can be traded by 
domestic investors (A-shares), shares denominated in foreign currencies and reserved to 
foreign investors (B-shares), and shares of companies listed or cross-listed overseas (H-
shares, for those listed in Honk Kong).
5 Split-share structures are common around the 
world and typically warrant owners different rights (Faccio and Lang, 2002). An 
unparalleled feature of ownership structures in China was the existence of NTS, typically 
belonging to the State or to domestic financial institutions ultimately owned by central or 
local governments. NTS shares had been issued to the founders of a corporation, business 
                                                
5   Market segmentation is relevant for pricing. Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2009) compare the 
performance of A and B shares for 75 companies for the period 1993-2001, finding a 421.8% premium for 
A shares over B shares, regardless of equal property rights on dividends. 11
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partners or employees. As of February 2005, NTS accounted for about two thirds of the 
total number of outstanding shares
6. 
Regulatory authorities soon recognized the issues associated with the 
predominance of NTS. First, NTS hindered the functioning of an active market for 
corporate control: holders of TS were typically minority shareholders with limited power 
to affect management decisions. Second, NTS made the major shareholders relatively 
indifferent to stock price movements due to the impossibility to sell the shares. Third, the 
limited free float made the domestic market extremely illiquid and volatile. Fourth, the 
inefficiency of the domestic market induced many valuable Chinese companies to list 
overseas, Hong Kong being one of the preferred destinations. This adversely affected 
domestic investors who were prevented from investing in the best companies, and were 
stuck with holdings of the less performing local companies. 
The Chinese government tried to deal with the problem of NTS in 1999 and 2001. 
In the first attempt, two companies were selected to sell their state shares to the floating 
shareholders. The experiment did not meet the investors’ expectations and within 15 days 
from the announcement of the transfer program the share price of the two companies had 
fallen by about 40 percent. The second attempt failed in 2001 because the proposal 
envisaged an equal pricing for tradable and non-tradable shares. The 2005 reform 
adopted the new strategy of forcing NTS holders to pay a compensation to TS holders in 
exchange for the right to sell their shares. Each company had to make a compensation 
                                                
6 Transfer of NTS had become possible since the mid 1990s through irregularly scheduled auctions and 
over-the-counter transactions, but in the context of huge differences (about 80%) between market prices 
and prices expressed by OTC transactions, see Chen and Xiong (2001). Green and Black (2003) study 840 
transactions taking place in the Shenzhen market in the period 1994-2003 and find that transfers often
involved large blocks affecting the control of companies. The predominant sellers were State-controlled 
shareholding companies, and the dominant buyers were private companies. 32% (46%) of the deals were 
associated with a change in control in 2001 (2002).12
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proposal that would be discussed among shareholders during a period of trading 
suspension. The proposal would then be publicly announced (but not implemented) and 
trading in the shares restarted. After a few weeks, a shareholders’ meeting would be 
called and the compensation proposal would pass only if approved by a majority of two 
thirds of the votes of TS holders. Share trading would also be suspended between the 
announcement of the shareholders’ meeting and the final vote. Trading would be 
restarted and the compensation paid out after the final vote. See Li at al. (2007) for an 
extended description of this process.  
Several other measures were taken to facilitate the 2005 reform, among which
7 a 
twelve-month lockup period for the holders of NTS in order to dilute the effect of a 
possible stock overhang due to a massive future sale of shares
8. In the two years after 
expiration of the lock-up, NTS holders owning more than 5% of the listed companies 
were further prohibited from trading on the stock exchange more than 5% (10%) of the 
company’s total share capital within 12 (24) months. By the end of 2006, and thus within 
the announced deadline, the restructuring process was virtually completed, see Figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
                                                
7 Other relevant measures are (i) the CSRC stated that reform-compliant companies would be given priority 
to raise new capital (primary issues of shares and IPOs had been frozen since April 2005), (ii) the company 
and the controlling shareholder are entitled to stabilize the market price of the shares for example through 
buy-backs (Wan, Yuan and Ha, 2005), (iii) the legislative department amended the Company Law and the 
Securities Law to perfect the legal framework concerning the capital market. At the end of January, 2006, 
there was a further rule change making it easier for strategic investors to buy stakes in listed companies; 
under the new rules the purchase of A-shares is no longer reserved to the small group of qualified investors 
but is extended to all the investors willing to buy a minimum stake of 10% of the company and hold the 
shares for more than three years. 
8 Indeed, policy guidelines stated that the official objective of the reform is not to reduce state holdings, but 
just to eliminate NTS, and that control will remain tightly in the hands of the government in enterprises 
deemed strategic (Mattlin, 2007). 13
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3. The relevant characteristics 
We study the price and volume effects of the announcement of elimination of NTS from 
the Chinese stock market. In doing so, we explain the cross-section of abnormal returns 
in the event period
9 on the basis of characteristics measured before the event period. In 
what follows we describe all the variables selected for our empirical analysis. 
We have collected market data for all the companies listed in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (the source is DataStream). Governance 
and capital structure data are from the China Listed Firm’s Corporate Governance 
CSMAR Database. The Nomura Institute of Capital Market Research provided us with 
detailed information about the compensation plan of each company. 
The reform started on April 29, 2005 with four companies (Tsingua Tongfang, Hebei 
Jinniu Energy Resources, Shanghai Zi Jiang Enterprise Group, and Sany Heavy 
Industry). Three companies successfully accomplished the transfer program in 38 trading 
days on average. They were followed by a second batch involving 41 companies. The 
duration of the programs of this batch ranged from 35 to 60 trading days, with an average 
of 42 trading days. The program then spread out gradually to the entire market. As of 
February 2007, 1,301 companies (98% of listed companies) had joined the process. 
We use a survivorship bias-free sample. The original sample of alive and dead 
companies that we download from DataStream involves 1,440 cases, but we discard some 
for various reasons: (a) disappearance before the beginning of the reform process, (b) 
suspension from trading as of February 2007 for unspecified reasons, (c) suspension from 
trading during the event window, (d) listing after September 2005, (e) no NTS even 
                                                
9 We regard the rate of return over the event period as being dominated by a surprise associated with 
announcement of the reform. 14
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before the beginning of the reform process (five cases), (f) discrepancies across data sets 
in the percentage of TS before and after the reform, (g) no data on corporate structure (15 
cases). Finally, we do not include companies involved in the first two batches. The final 
sample includes 1,142 companies. 
The percentage of TS before the reform was equal to 36% on average, with a minimum 
of 0% and a maximum of 79%. The standard deviation across firms was 11.61%. After 
the reform the average proportion of shares that can be freely traded (not being subject to 
lockups) is about 46%. In 1,124 cases, compensation took the form of free distribution of 
bonus shares
10. Companies in the first batch transferred on average 3 shares per 10 shares 
owned by holders of TS. Companies belonging to the second batch distributed 3.5 shares 
per 10 shares. In subsequent batches, the bonus ratio remained quite close to the values 
established in the two pilot programs, with an average of 3.  
All the variables used in our empirical work are measured at the end of 2004, 
except for market-related characteristics which are measured in the period between t-130 
and t-10 where t is April 29, 2005, the date marking the beginning of the first pilot 
project. 
Public, Concentration, Dummy H, LPS, NCB, Largest, SOS, Dummy State and 
Institution account for the structure of ownership. Public is the ratio between NTS and 
TS
11 minus one. This variable may have several different interpretations, as it may be 
taken as a proxy for: (i) involvement of the public sector and operational inefficiency, (ii) 
corporate governance in the Chinese market as advocated by Xu and Wang (1999), (iii) 
future supply effects. A higher initial level of Public should therefore be associated with 
                                                
10 In other 52 cases, compensation was supplemented by payment of cash. In the remaining cases, it took 
the form of stock splits, options or pure cash payment. 
11 The sum of NTS and TS may be less than 100% due to the existence of H-shares and B-shares. 15
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positive post-announcement returns (also in light of the predictions of the model by Hong 
et al. 2006). 
Concentration represents the proportion of shares held by the ten largest tradable 
shareholders at the end of 2004. It measures potential coordination among tradable 
shareholders which may extract a larger compensation on the part of holders of NTS even 
though Haveman et al. (2008) claim that non-tradable shareholders made side-payments 
to mutual fund managers to induce them to accept a lower compensation. Dummy H is 
equal to 1 when the firm has outstanding H shares. LPS is defined as the percentage of 
legal person shares. Xu and Wang (1999) find a positive correlation between profitability 
and the fraction of legal person shares and a negative correlation between labor 
productivity and the proportion of state shares. LPS may also be relevant as a description 
of the ownership structure. NCB is the sum of the shareholding of the second through the 
tenth largest shareholder. A large value of NCB may be a substitute for weak corporate 
governance, see Lins (2003) for evidence in emerging markets. Largest is the proportion 
of shares held by the largest shareholder. SOS is the percentage of State owned shares. 
Dummy State is equal to one when the State is the major shareholder. Institution is the 
percentage of TS held by institutional investors. 
We measure governance through the use of Independent and Meeting. 
Independent is the proportion of independent directors in the board. Meeting is the 
number of meetings of the board during the year. These indicators are standard in the 
literature, see e.g. Denis and McConnell (2003). The previously defined variable NCB
may also be considered as a proxy for governance.  16
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We consider the following market-related characteristics: Beta (the liquidity beta 
interpreted as the sensitivity of the return of the stock with respect to aggregate liquidity 
shocks
12), Spread (the time series average of the ratio between the bid-ask spread and the 
average between the bid and the ask price), Sales (gross sales and other operating revenue 
less discounts, returns and allowances), Market value (the listed price of the TS 
multiplied by the total number of A shares), average Turnover (the ratio between the 
value of the total number of shares traded and the value of the total number of tradable 
shares), Volatility (the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression used to 
compute abnormal returns), Leverage (total debt over total assets), ROE (return on 
equity), Lagged returns. We do not include the price-to-book in view of the limitations 
highlighted by Wang and Xu (2004). To account for transparency, we use Big4, a dummy 
identifying firms which have accounts certified by a Big Four firm, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, Pricewaterhouse Coopers and Deloitte & Touche, to which we also added BDO 
International, providing auditing service to several listed Chinese companies. These firms 
may be more likely to ensure transparency because they have a greater reputation to 
uphold, because they may be more independent than local firms, or because they face 
greater legal liability (Michaely and Shaw, 1995). Importantly, previous research in 
emerging countries has shown that significantly better stock price performance is 
                                                
12  Following Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) the liquidity replicating portfolio is built starting from an 
indicator of liquidity for each stock, the estimate t i, γ  from  the  regression 
1 , , , , , , , , , , , , 1 , ) ( + + + × + + = t d i t d i
e
t d i t i t d i t i t i
e
t d i v r sign r r ε γ φ θ   where the dependent variable is the excess 
return on the stock on day d in month t and the regressors are respectively the return on the stock in the 
previous day of the month and a variable obtained from the multiplication of the sign of the excess return 
and the volume of the stock. The indicator proxies liquidity by an estimate of return reversal. The liquidity 
factor replicating portfolio is constructed each month by going long stocks with low liquidity and shorting 
stocks with high liquidity. Beta is the sensitivity of the rate of return of a stock with respect to the rate of 
return of the liquidity factor replicating portfolio, estimated with daily data during the period between t-130 
and t-10, where t is April 29, 2005. 17
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associated with firms that had indicators of higher disclosure quality, such as a Big Four 
auditor (Mitton, 2002). Dummy SEZ is equal to one when the company belongs to a 
special economic zone. 
4. Empirical analysis 
We first present summary statistics of the relevant characteristics, then we move 
on to the portfolio time-series approach and consider cross-sectional results and 
robustness analysis. We finally present some statistics about the changes in volume and 
liquidity. 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics about the variables. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Due to the large proportion of NTS existing before the reform, there is a 207% 
average increase in the potential supply of TS. Other interesting characteristics of the 
ownership structure are the following. Only 2% of firms in our sample had outstanding H 
shares. On average, legal person shares represent 25.63% of the total equity and State-
owned shares represent 34.02%. The average percentage of shares held by the second to 
the tenth shareholders is equal to 19.49%, close to the value reported by Berkman et al. 
(2009) while the largest shareholder holds on average 42.73% of the shares. On average, 
institutional investors hold 7.95% of the tradable shares, a percentage that is much lower 
than what happens in more mature equity markets. 16% of the firms in our sample belong 
to a special economic zone, which Calomiris et al. (2009) interpret as an indicator of the 
possibility to interfere with the management of a firm on the part of the local government. 18
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The average proportion of independent directors is 34.21% and the maximum is 50%. On 
average boards meet once a month.  
As to characteristics, the average beta with respect to the illiquidity premium is 
very small but highly variable across firms, with a minimum of -1.71 and a maximum of 
1.85. The average bid-ask spread is 0.38% with a maximum of 0.89%. The distribution of 
the spread across firms is non-normal, as the minimum is 0.15% and the standard 
deviation is 0.14%. The average return on equity is 5.11%. Average idiosyncratic 
volatility is 1.81%, corresponding to an annualized value of 28%. 
Table 2 reports correlation coefficients among relevant variables. Returns are 
computed on a three-day window starting from the announcement day (August 24).  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The table shows that returns are negatively correlated with Institution, Sales, Turnover, 
ROE and Lagged returns and positively correlated with Spread, Volatility and Leverage. 
Some of these correlations (see for example the coefficients between Returns and 
Volatility, Spread, ROE, Sales, Institutions) show that characteristics can be useful to 
learn which stocks benefited most from the announcement of the reform. However these 
are simple correlation coefficients and may depend on the influence of third variables.  
  Table 3 presents mean values of the variables for two different groups of firms.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The first (second) group is composed of firms belonging to the first (fourth) quartile of 
the return distribution during the event period. The table also reports the p-value of the t-
test for the hypothesis that the values in the first and fourth quartiles are significantly 19
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different. The table reveals that firms in the best quartile of returns are less present in the 
portfolios of institutional investors, are smaller, have a larger presence of non-controlling 
block-holders, larger spreads, larger volatility, more leverage, lower ROE, more negative 
lagged returns, pay less compensation during the reform, have a lower percentage of 
shares held by the largest shareholder, are less likely to be audited by an international 
firm, have lower concentration and have smaller market value. The results of the 
interquartile analysis are therefore consistent with those obtained from the simple 
correlation coefficients. However these comparisons do not account for the impact of 
third variables and do not take into account the return of firms relatively to the market. In 
what follows we turn to multivariate analysis and consider abnormal returns. 
4.2. Portfolio time-series approach 
The first announcement of the pilot program goes back to April 29, 2005. At that 
time, a real concern was that a bad market reaction could scrap the reform entirely, due to 
the potential overhang associated with the supply increase
13. At that stage the credibility 
of the public authorities to carry out the reform was weak due to previous failed attempts 
to reform. Moreover, there was uncertainty about relevant details of the reform 
mechanism, like the timing of its extension to the whole market and the choice of the 
compensation mechanism devised by the government. Not surprisingly, the early reaction 
by the market was negative. The date of April 29, 2005, corresponds to the beginning of 
an extended period of weakness bringing the index from 1,169 on April 28 to 1,013 on 
                                                
13 The China Daily, on the basis of interviews with Chinese security analysts, reported on May 10 that “The 
short-term impact of the news of the non-tradable share flotation could be limited as regulators will not 
allow all non-tradable shares to flood the market in one go…But in the long run, the flotation of these 
shares may push down average price/earnings ratios and further polarize share prices”. 20
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June 3 (due to holidays, Chinese stock markets were closed until the week starting on 
May 9). The market return was negative in the four weeks following the announcement (-
4.4%, -0.75%, -4.3%, -3.6% respectively).  
On June 20, the reform process was formally extended to a second batch of 42 
companies. By confirming the basic structure of the negotiation mechanism tested in the 
first batch, this announcement provided clues on the amount of compensation for tradable 
shareholders. Yet at this stage the timing of the extension of the process to the market as 
a whole was still completely uncertain. The market was again negative in the weeks 
following the announcement, with returns of -1.23%, -4.20%, -3.56% and 0.80% 
respectively. Investors’ skepticism about the reform may well have been justified by the 
reform experience of the first batch that, as shown by Bengtsson (2005), was not 
particularly attractive to investors
14.  
On Friday, August 19, the companies of the second experimental batch concluded 
their reform. On August 24 the CSRC announced a set of rules for the application of the 
reform to all the remaining companies. On September 4 the third batch of 40 companies 
started the reform. During the four trading weeks after August 19, the market returns 
were 0.37%, 1.45%, 0.07% and 1.96% for the Shanghai stock market and 0.41%, 2.85%, 
0.95% and 3.34% respectively for the Shenzhen market.  
  To provide a comprehensive view of the stock market reactions we have 
estimated a simple regression of daily returns on dummy variables for the April, June and 
                                                
14 The price of Sany Heavy Industry (one of the three companies included in the pilot project) dropped 30% 
on the day of the payment of the compensation and kept falling thereafter, forcing the managers to revise 
the original offer. The capitalization of Shanghai Zijiang Enterprise Group, a second company included in 
the pilot project, also decreased importantly around the event date. 21
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August announcements
15. We have also built three risk factors which may help interpret 
investors’ perceptions. The size and floating ratio factors have been built following the 
methodology described by Fama and French (1996). For example, in the case of size, at 
the beginning of each month, Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen (ZSE) stocks are allocated to 
two groups (small or big, S or B) based on whether their market value (MV) during the 
previous month is below or above the median MV for the specific market. Then the 
stocks are sorted in three floating ratio groups (low, medium, or high: L, M, H) based on 
the bottom 30 percent, middle 40 percent and top 30 percent of the floating ratio. Value-
weighted portfolio returns are then computed for each portfolio. Floating is defined as the 
difference between the average returns of the two high-FR portfolios and the average 
returns of the two low-FR
16 and can therefore be interpreted as a portfolio that is long 
good governance firms and short bad governance firms. With a similar methodology we 
built a liquidity portfolio after ranking stocks on the basis of their liquidity indicator as in 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). 
For each of these portfolio returns we run a regression on constant and dummy 
variables for the three event periods
17, using 243 daily observations between 15 October 
2004 and 15 October 2005 (see table 4 for the results).  
                                                
15 We compute a market index by considering the actual float of each company. This is important in view 
of the large difference between float and capitalization caused by the existence of NTS. A capitalization 
index would include the quantity of both TS and NTS to compute the weights assigned to the various 
stocks and would not reflect market conditions. Wang and Xu (2004) also compute a float-weighted market 
index. We use the Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co Limited data in order to build a unique 
float-weighted market index mixing companies traded both in Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
16 We have followed Wang and Xu (2004) and have used the part of floating ratio that is orthogonal to size 
measured as the log of the market value. Theoretically, the average return of FR should be negative as it 
represents a portfolio long good governance companies and short bad governance companies. However, 
Wang and Xu (2004) themselves find that the average return of FR is negative and explain their result on 
the basis of the better performance offered by companies with more efficient governance. 
17 We use a three-day return involving the announcement day and two days after the announcement. 22
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INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
In the case of the market return and the size factor, we find that the August 
dummy is significantly positive while the other two dummy variables are not. The 
floating ratio portfolio is significantly negative both in June and in August while the 
liquidity portfolio is significantly positive in June and negative in August. Overall, April 
has not caused any noticeable market reaction, while in June the floating ratio portfolio is 
significant with the expected sign (companies with a bad corporate governance increasing 
more than companies with a good corporate governance) but the liquidity portfolio has 
the wrong sign. In August, all factor portfolios reacted in unison: the market went up, 
small companies increased more than large companies, companies with a bad governance 
went up more than companies with a good governance, and illiquid stocks increased more 
than liquid stocks. 
This pattern of returns is not consistent with investors being concerned with future 
supply shocks. While the market increase could in principle be explained by over-
compensation and/or by speculation, the joint reaction of the four portfolios are coherent 
with a fundamental-based explanation looking at future improvements in fundamentals 
themselves. Finally, contrary to the hypothesis of Calomiris et al. (2010), the observed 
changes in the systematic risk factors are not consistent with an explanation of the reform 
as a profit-minimizing strategy on the part of the government. 
4.3. Cross sectional results 
Table 5 reports the results of multivariate regressions of abnormal returns during 
the event period on characteristics measured before the start of the reform.  23
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INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The dependent variable is the residual of a market model estimated with daily data 
between t-130 and t-10 where t is the date of the first reform announcement (April, 29). 
The event window includes the day of the announcement and two days after the 
announcement. The market portfolio is either the Shanghai or the Shenzhen index 
depending on the listing of the specific company. All the cross-sectional regressions 
include sector fixed effects
18 and robust standard errors. The explanatory variables have 
been winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. 
The first column considers variables related with corporate governance and 
ownership. In this regression, shares held by the non-controlling blockholders and the 
potential increase in NTS have positive coefficients while holdings of institutional 
investors and the H-shares dummy have negative coefficients. Abnormal returns have 
been larger in firms with stronger monitoring on the part of large shareholders, with a 
larger potential for privatization, in firms neglected by institutional investors and not 
traded by international investors through H-shares. This is consistent with the view that 
investors have marked up the prices of firms that had the best potential to profit from the 
reform. 
The second column considers variables related with liquidity and finds that 
companies with a larger Bid-ask spread before the reform had better returns after the 
announcement. The liquidity beta is not significant. This might be consistent with 
liquidity risk not being priced in the Chinese stock market
19.  
                                                
18 Control for industry effects is important as strategic industries are not expected to change control, see 
Mattlin (2007). 
19 Acharya and Pedersen (2005) also find that the premium associated with liquidity risk is much smaller 
than the illiquidity premium. 24
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The third column considers both governance and liquidity variables together and 
finds that the results of the previous regressions are unaffected.  
The fourth column considers a regression with various characteristics. The 
relevant variables are Sales (negative), Volatility (positive), Turnover (negative), ROE
(negative),  Lagged returns (negative). Smaller, more volatile, less traded and less 
profitable companies enjoy better returns after the reform announcement. There is mean 
reversion in cross-sectional returns. 
The fifth column considers the joint impact of ownership, corporate governance, 
liquidity and characteristics. The regression confirms all the previous results except for 
the relevance of NCB. It is noteworthy that stocks neglected by institutional investors 
have larger returns even after accounting for characteristics. In principle institutions may 
have disliked stocks on the basis of observable characteristics so that the effect of the 
institution variable could simply proxy for omitted variables. Our evidence shows that 
holdings of institutional investors are relevant above and beyond stock characteristics. 
Also of interest is that Public is significantly positive but that other variables 
characterizing the current corporate governance structure are not relevant. Investors 
attached positive value to the discontinuous change associated with the potential sale of 
NTS. 
The final column of table 5 considers a regression where the dependent variable is 
given by the compensation paid by each company. In evaluating the rationality of 
investors’ response to the announcement it is interesting to understand whether the 
variables that explain the cross-section of abnormal returns also explain the compensation 
differences. The empirical analysis shows that the relevant variables are Public (positive), 25
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the dummy for H-shares (negative), non-controlling blockholders (negative), the bid-ask 
spread (negative), past volatility (negative), a dummy for cash payment (negative)
20. 
Comparing the fifth and the sixth columns of the table we observe that there is only 
partial overlap between variables affecting returns and variables affecting compensation. 
Sometimes the sign changes across the two regressions (this happens for bid-ask spread 
and volatility), sometimes variables are significant in only one of the two regressions 
(Institution,  Sales,  Turnover,  Roe,  Lagged returns). Investors have used available 
information to determine returns ahead of compensation payment, but the impact of the 
information set is clearly not limited to those elements useful to form a short run 
expectation of the one-off compensation. Investors have tried to look beyond the short 
run compensation effect in order to evaluate the impact of the reform announcement
21. 
4.4. Robustness analysis 
We compute abnormal returns using our market index rather than the location-
specific index. The results are very similar to our previous results and are not reported but 
are available upon request from the authors. The second robustness test looks at different 
definitions of the relevant window and estimation in other periods, see table 6. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
                                                
20 The negative impact of the dummy for cash payment is consistent with firms transferring less shares. In 
general, our results are consistent with those of Li et al. (2010).  
21 We cannot exclude that political connections may play a role in explaining excess returns at 
the time of the announcement of the reform. A potential difference may stem from the 
ownership rights accruing to the local government (municipal, province, etc.) vis a vis central 
government. In the first case, local bureaucrats, with their promotion tied to local economic 
development, may limit expropriation and improve corporate governance, reducing the potential impact of 
the reform. (see Fan et al, 2011). Unfortunately, this differential effects could not be singled out due to lack 
of data 26
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We repeat the regressions using a four-day window that includes the day before the 
announcement and the two days after the announcement and a six-day window that starts 
two days before the announcement and ends three days after the announcement. The 
results are virtually unchanged except for the dummy for the special economic zone 
becoming significantly positive. Next we separately consider the day of the 
announcement and the two after the announcement of April and June. We have argued 
that the best period to gauge the impact of the reform is the one following the August 
announcement, however investors may have reacted in earlier periods. In April some 
variables are significant and coherent with the signs found in August. This happens to 
Institution and Lagged returns. However Public, H-shares, Volatility, Turnover and ROE
are not significant in April (but they were in August). Moreover, Meeting and Beta are 
significant in April but not in August and Sales is significant in both periods but the sign 
is opposite. In June Institution is positive rather than negative, Spread is not significant, 
Volatility is negative, Turnover is positive, and ROE is not significant.  
Finally, in table 7 we consider some robustness analysis including some other 
variables.  
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
We exclude NCB and include the shares held by the largest shareholder. The latter is 
significant and the variables that were significant in table 5 are still significant here with 
the same sign. Next we go back to the original specification and include in turn the 
percentage of State-owned shares, the percentage of legal person shares, a dummy equal 
to one when the State is the main shareholder. These variables are not significantly 
different from zero and the other results are unaffected. Then we exclude Dummy H and 27
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Sales and include Big4. The latter is significant: ceteris paribus, companies with better 
accounting quality had lower returns than others. We next include Concentration (here 
we exclude Institution due to the large correlation between this and Concentration). The 
sign is coherent with the hypothesis that a larger concentration in the holdings of NTS 
may be negative for investors due to the possibility of a coalition of mutual fund 
managers in accepting lower compensation. We also measure the dimension in terms of 
Market value rather than Sales but there is no change in results. Finally we include 
contemporaneous  Turnover rather than lagged Turnover and the sign is positive, 
consistently with the idea that stocks characterized by larger speculation had the larger 
increase 
4.5 Liquidity and trading during the event period 
In order to evaluate the changes to liquidity and trading during the event period 
we consider four dimensions: volume of trading, average daily turnover, average daily 
bid-ask spread, average daily price range. In table 8 we report the value of each variable 
for each decile before the event window (between t-130 and t-10 where t is the date of the 
first reform announcement, 29 April 2005) and during the event window (the day of the 
announcement and two days after the announcement of August 24 2005) as well as their 
percentage changes. Variables are sorted into deciles based on the average daily value of 
the period before the event window.  
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Before the announcement, the first decile accounted for only 1% of total volume 
and the tenth decile accounted for 47% of the volume. After the event the two numbers 28
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are 2% and 38% respectively. In general there is a negative relationship between the 
percentage increase during the event and the initial distribution of volume. The second 
block of the table is about the average daily turnover. Here we observe a percentage 
increase in turnover in all the deciles, which reflect the increase in trading during the 
event period. Again, the larger percentage increases are associated with lower initial 
turnover. The third block reports information about the bid-ask spread, which decreases 
for the less liquid stocks and increases for the other deciles. The overall increase in the 
spread may be coherent with the increased volatility during the event period, which is 
also apparent from the fourth block of table 8. In unreported results, we find that the 
average daily spread during the 60 days after the announcement decreases for all deciles, 
coherently with the idea that the reform increases liquidity.  
This evidence is not consistent with a simple generalized increase in speculation 
or with disagreement about the ultimate consequences of the reform. Investors showed a 
preference for trading stocks that were neglected before the beginning of the reform.  
5. Conclusions 
We have studied the price and volume effects of the announcement of elimination 
of NTS from the Chinese stock market. The reform had no impact on the ownership 
structure of firms in our event period, but laid down the conditions for important future 
changes in ownership, liquidity and corporate governance, ultimately leading to improved 
profitability and decreased expected returns. In a forward-looking stock market, 
expectations of future changes to fundamentals should immediately affect market prices 
and liquidity. We observe the cross section of abnormal returns and find that stocks with 29
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less attractive characteristics (small stocks, stocks characterized by historically poor 
returns, stocks issued by companies with less transparent accounts and poorer 
governance, less liquid stocks) benefited from this reform relatively more than stocks that 
already had better characteristics. We also study the time series of factor portfolio returns 
and find that  systematic risk factors like size, corporate governance and liquidity were 
important in changing stock valuations. Finally, turnover indicators confirm that more 
attention was given to historically neglected stocks.  
The variables explaining the cross section of compensations do not correspond 
entirely with the variables explaining the cross section of stock returns. This is an 
interesting result which suggests that when reacting to the announcement Chinese 
investors have looked beyond short run compensation effects. Moreover, the prices of 
stocks with “worse” characteristics increased more than the prices of stocks with “better” 
characteristics. The results are robust also to including several other variables and 
considering different event windows. Revealingly, the same variables were not relevant 
in other sample periods when investors did not believe that the reform was feasible.  
The Chinese stock market may provide several other research opportunities. One 
interesting avenue of research is to study the changes in corporate governance of 
companies after their reform. Lin (2009) documents an important effect on related party 
transactions. Sales of stocks on the open market by non-tradable shareholders are likely 
to cause changes in the ownership structure that may also affect corporate governance in 
the future. The intensification of shareholders’ activism and its impact on the 
performance of the company is another interesting topic, where there is much need of 
evidence coming from international countries. The study of this process promises 
important insights into the relative role of dynamically changing internal mechanisms for 
corporate governance in the context of a global environment which may lag in terms of 
the general protection of investors. 30
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Figure 1. Market Performance and Progress of NTS Reform. 
The figure reports the daily Return Index for the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite 
Index (left scale) and the percentage of companies entering the NTS reform program 
(right scale) from January 2005 to March 2007. 33
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Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Returns 1.47% 0.04 -9.53% 25.27%
Public 207% 1.50 48% 1065%
Dummy H 0.02 0.15 0 1
NCB 19.49% 0.14 0.62% 52.95%
Largest 42.73% 0.16 6.14% 84.85%
Concentration 4.54% 0.06 0.46% 35.65%
LPS 25.63% 0.26 0.00% 84.97%
SOS 34.02% 0.26 0.00% 75.32%
Dummy State 0.22 0.41 0 1
Dummy SEZ 0.16 0.36 0 1
Independent 34.21% 0.05 18.18% 50.00%
Meeting 12.36 3.89 6 25
Institution 7.95% 0.14 0.00% 63.54%
Big 4 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Beta 0.00 0.69 -1.71 1.85
Spread 0.38% 0.00 0.15% 0.89%
Sales 1.61 2.81 0.00 17.71
Market value 2.21 2.72 0.40 19.75
Turnover 2.96 2.40 0.31 13.07
Volatility 1.81 0.48 0.94 3.30
Leverage 31.39% 0.20 0.00% 95.41%
ROE 5.11% 0.13 -69.26% 32.33%
Lagged returns -14.46% 0.17 -48.74% 41.91%
Compensation 2.61 1.25 0.00 11.00
Table 1. Summary statistics of the relevant variables.  
The table reports summary statistics about the variables. Returns are computed over the 
day of the announcement and two days after the announcement of August 24. All the 
variables are measured at the end of 2004, except for market-related characteristics which 
are measured in the period between t-130 and t-10, where t is April 29. Public: NTS over 
TS minus 1; Dummy H: a dummy equal to 1 when the firm has outstanding H shares; 
NCB: the sum of the shareholding of the second through the tenth largest shareholder; 
Largest: the proportion of shares held by the largest holders; Concentration: the 
proportion of TS held by the ten largest holders; LPS: the % of legal person shares; SOS: 
the % of state-owned shares; Dummy State: a dummy equal to 1 when the State is the 
major shareholder; Dummy SEZ: a dummy equal to 1 when the company belongs to a 
special economic zone; Independent: the proportion of independent directors in the 
board; Meeting: the number of meetings of the board during the year; Institution: the % 
of TS held by institutional investors; Big4: a dummy identifying firms which have 
accounts certified by a Big Four firm; Beta: the sensitivity of the return of the stock with 
respect to aggregate liquidity shocks; Spread: the daily average bid-ask spread of the 
closing prices; Sales: gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and 
allowances; Market value: the listed price of the TS multiplied by the total number of A 
shares; Turnover: the daily average ratio between the total number of shares traded in a 
given day and the total number of TS; Volatility: the standard deviation of the residuals 
from the regression used to compute abnormal returns; Leverage: total debt over total 
assets; ROE: returns on equity; Lagged returns: the returns over the period; 
Compensation: the number of shares that NTS holders pay to holders of TS. 34
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Dummy H -0.07 0.34* 1
NCB 0.05 0.11* 0.18* 1
Dummy SEZ 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.09* 1
Independent -0.01 0.029 0.03 0.05 0.08* 1
Meeting 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.06 1
Institution -0.31* 0.03 0.19* 0.09* 0.01 0.00 0.01 1
Beta 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.08* 0.01 1
Spread 0.20* -0.04 -0.12* 0.09* 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.15* 0.14* 1
Sales -0.19* 0.20* 0.32* -0.10* 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.26* -0.01 -0.19* 1
Turnover -0.10* -0.016 0.01 0.12* -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.14* -0.12* 0.00 -0.06 1
Volatility 0.19* -0.053 0.01 0.12* 0.00 -0.01 0.09* -0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.14* 0.36* 1
Leverage 0.08* -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.11* 0.02 0.03 0.07 1
ROE -0.29* 0.09* 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.10* 0.29* -0.08* -0.19* 0.21* 0.10* -0.23* -0.02 1
Lagged returns -0.25* 0.068 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.36* 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.14* 0.00 -0.07 0.09 1
Compensation -0.08 0.25* 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.10* 0.00 -0.10* -0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.03
Table 2. Correlation coefficients across returns and relevant variables.  
The table reports correlation coefficients among the selected variables defined as in Table 
1. 
Quartile 1 Quartile 4 P-value 
Returns -3.48% 7.43% 0.00
Public 210% 208% 0.88
Dummy H 1.25 0.63 0.19
NCB 18.52% 21.31% 0.02
Largest 44.91% 39.47% 0.00
Concentration 6.52% 3.50% 0.00
LPS 23.60% 26.47% 0.18
SOS 35.63% 33.11% 0.25
Dummy State 0.21 0.23 0.54
Dummy SEZ 0.13 0.16 0.24
Independent 34% 34% 0.48
Meeting 12.34 12.27 0.84
Institution 14.53% 3.10% 0.00
Big 4 0.15 0.03 0.00
Beta -0.01 0.07 0.16
Spread 0.35% 0.42% 0.00
Sales 2.46 1.01 0.00
Market value 3.28 1.34 0.00
Turnover 2.86 3.62 0.00
Volatility 1.76 1.96 0.00
Leverage 30.47% 34.56% 0.02
ROE 8.53% 0.71% 0.00
Lagged returns -7.53% -19.90% 0.00
Compensation 2.59 2.40 0.09
Table 3. Quartile analysis. 
The table shows the mean values of the variables for two different groups of firms. 
Variables are defined as in table 1. Quartile 1 is composed of firms belonging to the first 
quartile of the return distribution over the day of the announcement and two days after 
the announcement of August 24; Quartile 4 is composed of firms belonging to the fourth 
quartile of the return distribution over the same period. The table also reports the p-value 
for the hypothesis that the values in the first and fourth quartiles are significantly 
different.  35
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Market Size Float Liquidity
April -1.213 -0.478 -0.074 -0.072
(0.743) (0.626) (0.088) (0.094)
June 0.829 0.227 -0.166*** 0.077***
(0.930) (0.180) (0.049) (0.027)
August 0.549** 1.178*** -0.189* -0.288**
(0.254) (0.350) (0.098) (0.143)
Table 4. Portfolio time-series analysis.
The table shows the regression coefficients of each of the three dummy variables for the 
event periods. April is a dummy variable equal to one for the day of the announcement 
and two days after the announcement of April 29. June is a dummy variable equal to one 
for the day of the announcement and two days after the announcement of June 20. August 
is a dummy variable equal to one for the day of the announcement and two days after the 
announcement of August 24. The dependent variables in the columns are the returns (i) of 
the market, (ii) of the size factor, (iii) of the float factor, (iv) of the liquidity factor. For 
each of these factor returns a regression is run on a constant and a dummy using 243 
daily observations between 15 October 2004 and 15 October 2005. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses; significance levels are denoted by * for 10%, ** for 
5% and *** for 1%. 36
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Compensation
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Institution -0.094*** -0.088*** -0.027*** -0.029
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.034)
Public 0.594*** 0.593*** 0.669*** 2.287***
(0.096) (0.091) (0.087) (0.339)
Dummy H -1.938*** -1.507** -1.277** -5.855**
(0.662) (0.645) (0.599) (2.273)
NCB 0.026*** 0.020** 0.011 -0.044*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.025)
Independent 0.454 0.296 1.024 3.157
(2.761) (2.699) (2.391) (6.869)
Meeting 0.038 0.031 0.004 -0.030
(0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.088)
Dummy SEZ 0.416 0.394 0.443 -0.787
(0.321) (0.316) (0.280) (0.924)
Beta 0.063 0.068 -0.032 -0.294
(0.202) (0.190) (0.177) (0.532)
Spread 0.063*** 0.048*** 0.043*** -0.084***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.029)
Sales -0.221*** -0.203*** -0.136
(0.035) (0.035) (0.208)
Volatility 2.021*** 1.567*** -2.328***
(0.258) (0.247) (0.816)
Turnover -1.212*** -0.631*** -0.423
(0.219) (0.213) (0.639)
Leverage 0.621 0.611 -1.279
(0.545) (0.500) (1.786)
ROE -0.044*** -0.043*** 0.045
(0.011) (0.011) (0.035)




Constant 0.088 -0.347 -1.504 -2.153*** -5.038*** 28.337***
(1.135) (0.642) (1.174) (0.650) (1.151) (3.391)
Observations 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142
R-squared 0.193 0.089 0.216 0.291 0.371 0.156
Residuals from market Model
Table 5. Multivariate regressions. 
The table presents the results of cross sectional analysis where the dependent variable in 
the columns from (i) to (v) is the residual of a market model estimated with daily data 
over the period t-130 and t-10 where t is the date of the first reform announcement of 
April 29; the residuals are computed over the day of the announcement and two days 
after the announcement of August 24. The dependent variable in column (vi) is the 
compensation paid by each company. Independent variables are defined as in table 1. 
Dummy Cash is a dummy equal to one if the compensation is paid also in the form of 
cash and/or warrants. All regressions include sector fixed effects; robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses; the explanatory variables have been winsorized at the 1
st and 
99
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August [-1;+2] August [-2;+3] April [0;+2] June [0;+2]
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Institution -0.014* -0.017** -0.032*** 0.053***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
Public 1.186*** 0.805*** -0.036 0.281***
(0.119) (0.098) (0.129) (0.077)
Dummy H -2.679*** -2.320*** -0.601 -1.781***
(0.772) (0.739) (1.093) (0.583)
NCB -0.003 0.012 -0.004 0.016**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008)
Independent -1.693 -0.568 2.771 -0.505
(2.542) (2.989) (4.037) (2.066)
Meeting 0.066** 0.016 0.077* 0.040
(0.029) (0.030) (0.044) (0.025)
Dummy SEZ 0.676** 0.829** 0.683 -0.060
(0.291) (0.327) (0.523) (0.241)
Beta 0.252 0.165 -0.691** -0.022
(0.185) (0.212) (0.282) (0.148)
Spread 0.030*** 0.060*** -0.032** -0.003
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008)
Sales -0.107*** -0.116*** 0.168*** -0.212***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.061) (0.034)
Volatility 0.748*** 1.368*** -0.580 -0.723***
(0.267) (0.301) (0.387) (0.249)
Turnover 0.115 -0.462* -0.304 0.792***
(0.215) (0.251) (0.341) (0.215)
Leverage 0.452 0.654 0.335 -0.373
(0.557) (0.615) (0.860) (0.512)
ROE -0.046*** -0.060*** 0.012 -0.002
(0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.010)
Lagged returns -0.039*** -0.066*** -0.046*** -0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Constant -4.999*** -6.576*** -0.343 0.420
(1.229) (1.405) (1.829) (0.962)
Observations 1142 1142 1142 1142
R-squared 0.291 0.319 0.099 0.106
Residuals from market Model
Table 6: Robustness analysis: Other periods. 
The table presents the results of cross sectional analyses where the dependent variables 
are the residual of a market model estimated with daily data between t-130 and t-10 
where t is the date of the first reform announcement, April 29. In column (i) the residuals 
are computed between t-1 and t+2 where t is August 24; in column (ii) the residuals are 
computed between t-2 and t+3 where t is August 24; in column (iii) the residuals are 
computed between t and t+2 where t is April 29; in column (iv) the residuals are 
computed between t and t+2 where t is June 20 All regressions include sector fixed 
effects; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; the explanatory variables have 
been winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles; significance levels are denoted by * for 
10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. 38
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Institution -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.035*** -0.020** -0.022**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Public 0.725*** 0.673*** 0.670*** 0.673*** 0.588*** 0.677*** 0.684*** 0.652***
(0.083) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.079)
Dummy H -1.307** -1.265** -1.354** -1.274** -0.505 -1.491** -1.064*
(0.578) (0.601) (0.609) (0.596) (0.852) (0.605) (0.577)
NCB 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.014* 0.011 0.012 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Independent 1.083 1.010 1.039 0.999 1.097 1.172 1.134 -0.060
(2.387) (2.394) (2.394) (2.394) (2.422) (2.394) (2.430) (2.308)
Meeting 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.006 0.001 -0.000
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
Dummy SEZ 0.393 0.431 0.463 0.443 0.471* 0.454 0.433 0.501**
(0.284) (0.286) (0.283) (0.279) (0.284) (0.281) (0.280) (0.255)
Beta -0.027 -0.033 -0.029 -0.034 -0.048 -0.035 -0.031 0.061
(0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.178) (0.180) (0.178) (0.180) (0.158)
Spread 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.020**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Sales -0.198*** -0.202*** -0.204*** -0.203*** -0.219*** -0.192***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Volatility 1.562*** 1.570*** 1.566*** 1.566*** 1.687*** 1.567*** 1.615*** 0.489*
(0.246) (0.248) (0.247) (0.247) (0.248) (0.249) (0.248) (0.250)
Turnover -0.704*** -0.637*** -0.632*** -0.640*** -0.623*** -0.643*** -0.661***
(0.214) (0.214) (0.213) (0.215) (0.215) (0.216) (0.215)
Leverage 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.620 0.427 0.579 0.503 0.281
(0.498) (0.501) (0.500) (0.500) (0.505) (0.502) (0.504) (0.475)
ROE -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.045***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Lagged returns -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.063*** -0.069*** -0.064*** -0.052***

















Constant -4.067*** -4.977*** -4.992*** -5.000*** -5.371*** -5.151*** -4.890*** -2.695**
(1.171) (1.177) (1.147) (1.160) (1.160) (1.153) (1.180) (1.091)
Observations 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142
R-squared 0.376 0.371 0.371 0.371 0.355 0.3680 . 3640 . 4 4 1
Residuals from market Model
Table 7: Robustness analysis: Other variables. 
The table presents the results of cross sectional analyses where the dependent variable is 
the residual of a market model estimated with daily data; the estimation period is between 
t-130 and t-10 where t is the date of the first reform announcement, April 29; the 
residuals and the Turnover Cont are computed over the day of the announcement and two 
days after the announcement of August 24. Independent variables are defined as in table 
1. All regressions include sector fixed effects; robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses; the explanatory variables have been winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th
percentiles; significance levels are denoted by * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. 39
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LOW 1% 2% 104% 0.67       3.44       413% 0.69       0.62       -11% 5.00       5.96       19%
2 2% 3% 42% 1.08      3.36      211% 0.49      0.48      -2% 4.27      5.77      35%
3 3% 4% 47% 1.36      5.01      269% 0.43      0.45      5% 3.95      5.31      34%
4 4% 5% 30% 1.61      4.70      192% 0.39      0.41      5% 3.75      4.91      31%
5 5% 7% 50% 1.90      5.72      200% 0.36      0.41      14% 3.60      4.88      36%
6 6% 7% 22% 2.26      7.81      245% 0.33      0.35      7% 3.44      4.64      35%
7 8% 8% 6% 2.70      7.38      173% 0.30      0.34      14% 3.29      4.44      35%
8 10% 11% 8% 3.40      9.15      169% 0.27      0.33      20% 3.14      4.37      39%
9 15% 14% -6% 4.66      10.33    122% 0.24      0.29      17% 2.93      4.07      39%
HIGH 47% 38% -18% 8.62      15.80    83% 0.19      0.23      22% 2.54      3.45      36%
VOLUME TURNOVER SPREAD PRICE RANGE
Table 8: Liquidity and trading during the event period.  
The table reports the values of variables for each decile before the event window 
(between t-130 and t-10 where t is the date of the first reform announcement, April 29) 
and during the event window (the day of the announcement and two days after the 
announcement of August 24) as well as their percentage changes. Variables are sorted 
into deciles based on the average daily value of the period before the event window. The 
variables of interest are: (i) the volume of trading, (ii) the daily turnover, (iii) the average 
daily bid-ask spread, (iv) the average daily price range. Block (i) shows the percentage of 
the total volume of the market in each decile in the period of reference. Blocks from (ii) 
to (iv) show the daily average value of the variable in each decile. 
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